State of Utah v. Daniel B. Powell : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Daniel B. Powell : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Karen A. Klucznik; Assistant Attorney General; Richard
Parmley; William McGuire; Attorneys for Appellee.
Scott L Wiggins; Arnold & Wiggins; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Powell, No. 20000991 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2991
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL B. POWELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000991-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A 
FIREARM, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (Supp. 1998); POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 1998); AND POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
RODNEY S. PAGE, PRESIDING 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RICHARD PARMLEY 
WILLIAM McGUIRE 
Deputy Davis County Attorneys 
ATTORNEYS F O ^ I J I ? ! ) ^ 
MAY 1 3 2002 
IN THE UTAH COIRI v^ t APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
t l ist' N o . JIIUMU'Wl- l A 
V. 
DANIEL B. POWELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BP 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A 
FIREARM, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (Supp. 1998); POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF L 1 us 
CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 1998); AND POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLA 11U> 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
RODNEY S. PAGE, PRESIDING 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (79 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4i>.».. 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RICHARD * H Ml EY 
WILLIAM M t. fKf 
Deputy Davis Count} •; 1 - <« 
A I l U H N h V H H < V I T H I \ N T uR Ar*r 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND RULE PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT 
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHERE THE GUN 
WAS FOUND IN A BACKPACK ON THE FRONT PASSENGER 
SEAT OF A CAR OVER WHICH HE HAD HAD SOLE 
POSSESSION FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS, AND 
WHERE HIS CIGARETTE ROLLING PAPERS WERE FOUND IN 
THE SAME BACKPACK 8 
II. DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED WHERE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL SPOKE AT SENTENCING AND 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE VERY SENTENCES COUNSEL 
REQUESTED 13 
CONCLUSION 16 
ADDENDUM A - Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 
l 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501 2, 8, 10 
State v. Banks,120?.2& 1380 (Utah 1986) 9, 13 
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995) 16 
State v. Dunn,S50?.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 2, 14, 15, 16 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) 9, 10, 12, 13 
State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, 988 P.2d 7 12 
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911 10 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1998) 16 
State v. Rivera, 906 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1995), 
rev 'd in part on other grounds, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997) 10. 12 
State v.Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) 9, 13 
State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1992) 13 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, 
cert, granted, 43?.3d 951 (Utah 2002) 14, 16 
State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64 (Utah 1993) 16 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 1998) I 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998) I, 2. 9 
ii 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001) 1 
Utah Const, art. I § 7 16 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 2, 14 
ui 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL B. POWELL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20000991-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 
2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
L Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant for illegal possession of 
a firearm where the gun was found in a backpack on the front 
passenger seat of a car over which he had had sole possession for 
approximately eight hours, and where his cigarette rolling papers were 
found in the same backpack? 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [this Court] must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, If 5, 975 P.2d 501 (quoting 
State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1998)). 
II. Should defendant's sentences be affirmed where defense counsel spoke 
at sentencing and defendant received the very sentences requested? 
Because this claim was not preserved below, defendant asks this Court to review it 
for plain error. Br. Aplt. at 5. To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that 
(1) an error occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(3) defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND RULE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory and rule provisions relevant to this appeal are attached at 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 8, 1999, defendant was charged by amended information with illegal 
possession of a handgun, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of controlled 
substance, and an improper lane change (R. 26-27). 
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial 
(R. 20-21; R. 92:2-3). After the State's case-m-chief, defendant moved to dismiss the 
illegal possession of a handgun charge and the improper lane change charge (R. 93:34). 
i 
The trial court granted defendant's motion as to the improper lane change charge, but 
denied his motion as to the illegal possession of a handgun charge (R. 93:34, 37). After 
defendant's case-in-chief and the State's rebuttal, the trial court found defendant guilty of 
the remaining three charges (R. 29-30; R. 93:77). 
Defendant, unable to attend sentencing because he was in a federal penitentiary in 
Pennsylvania, consented to be sentenced in absentia (R. 56-60, 66-67; R. 94 Tab 7:1). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to 0-5 years in prison for illegal possession of a 
handgun, and 6 months in jail for each of the remaining convictions (R. 61-62, 63-64; R. 
94 Tab 7:1-3). The sentences were to run concurrently to each other and, as requested by 
defense counsel, concurrent with the federal sentence defendant was then serving (R. 59-
60, 61-62, 63-64; R. 94 Tab 7:2-3).l Defendant timely appealed (R. 61-62, 66-68). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 17, 1998, defendant was involved in a car accident while driving on 
1-15 through Bountiful, Utah (R. 94:3). Defendant was alone in his car when the accident 
occurred and had been in sole possession of the car from mid-morning until 7:00 pm that 
evening, the time of the accident (R. 93:60-62). The accident involved four vehicles (R. 
93:4). However, only defendant's car was disabled (R. 93:4, 25). Thus, while the other 
!
 At the same hearing, defendant was sentenced to one year in jail for witness 
tampering, to run consecutively to the other sentences (R. 63-64; R. 94 Tab 7:1-3). The 
witness tampering charge related to a threat defendant made to Sergeant Anderson, an 
officer who testified at defendant's trial on the current charges (R. 2; R. 93:3-20; R. 94 
Tab 5:6-7). Defendant pleaded guilty to this offense (R. 94 Tab 5:6-7). 
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cars were driven into the emergency lane after the accident, defendant's car remained in 
the center lane of the highway (R. 93:4). 
When Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John Ely arrived, defendant was told to leave 
his vehicle and move to the side of the road, into the emergency lane (R. 93:5, 25). At 
that time, Trooper Ely "noticed a strong odor of burnt marijuana" (R. 93:26). When 
Sergeant Anderson arrived shortly thereafter, Ely told him of the odor (R. 93:26). 
For a time, however, the officers focused on clearing defendant's disabled car out 
of traffic's way (R. 93:5). Thus, Anderson instructed Ely to push the vehicle while 
Anderson steered it (R. 93:5). As Anderson opened the car door, he "smell[ed] the odor 
of burnt marijuana inside the car" (R. 93:6). Then, as Anderson went to get into the car, 
defendant "walked expeditiously towards me" (R. 93:5). "[I]t appeared to me he did not 
want me in the car" (R. 93:5). As they talked, Anderson "detected a strong odor of burnt 
marijuana" consistent with Trooper Ely's observation (R. 93:6). Anderson did however 
allow defendant to get into the car and steer it into the emergency lane (R. 93:5-6). 
Sergeant Anderson then confronted defendant with his suspicions regarding the 
marijuana odor (R. 93:6). Although defendant claimed he had not smoked any marijuana 
recently, Anderson told defendant that he was going to search defendant's car (R. 93:6-7). 
Defendant did not want the car searched; he told Anderson something "to the effect of 
don't search my vehicle" (R. 93:7, 20). 
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During the search, Sergeant Anderson found a long piece of wire consistent with 
that "used to clean out a marijuana pipe" on the driver's side floor board (R. 93:8). 
Around the console area, he found a cigarette lighter and some lip salve (R. 93:8). 
Anderson later found a marijuana pipe with marijuana in it approximately 5 to 8 feet from 
where defendant had been standing after the accident (R. 93:11). The pipe appeared to 
have recently been placed at that location because it did not have any scratches, marks, or 
dirt on it to indicate that it had been on the ground for a long period of time (Id.). 
In his search of defendant's car, Sergeant Anderson proceeded to the backpack 
sitting upright on the front passenger-side seat. In it, Anderson found cigarette rolling 
papers often used for rolling marijuana cigarettes, and a fanny pack that contained a 9-
millimeter handgun and several magazines of ammunition (R. 93:10, 12-13, 56). When 
Anderson approached defendant about the weapon, he and defendant "got into a little bit 
of an argument about the status of the gun, whether or not it was loaded" (R. 93:15). 
Defendant was "adamant" that the gun was not loaded and accused Anderson of putting 
the bullet in the chamber (R. 93:15, 28). Defendant, however, never indicated any 
surprise that the gun was found in the car (R. 93:68). He merely said that the gun was his 
wife's and that she had placed it in the car (R. 93:15). 
At trial, defendant claimed that he volunteered to move his car for police only 
because it was his car, he was the one who was in the wreck, and he was sure the officers 
"got enough other stuff to do" (R. 93:54). He also claimed that he "didn't have any 
problem with [Sergeant Anderson] searching the car" (R. 93.55). Defendant then claimed 
the wire found m the car was used to dig his stereo knob out of the console when it fell 
off (R. 93 59). He claimed the lighter was used to burn incense (R. 93:59) He claimed 
he had never seen the marijuana pipe before and that he wouldn't use such a pipe because 
"[t]he unnatural metal gives . . . off vapors" and is "not healthy for you" (R. 93 59). 
Concerning the backpack found on the front passenger seat, both defendant and his 
wife testified that the backpack and the gun found inside were hers (R. 93:39, 41-42, 56, 
65-66). Defendant admitted that he knew his wife usually earned the gun in that 
backpack (R. 93:65-66). He just didn't know she had left the backpack in the car that day 
(R. 93:57, 66). He explained that his wife must have left it in the car earlier that morning 
when she hurriedly left the car after an argument (R. 93:57, 66). He claimed he did not 
notice the backpack after she left because "everything was in the back of the car" until the 
accident, when, because of the force of the collision, it "all ended up in the front seat and 
the front seat floor area" (R. 93:66). Thus, until then, "I didn't know [the gun] was there" 
(R. 93:57). Defendant acknowledged, however, that the cigarette papers found m the 
same backpack were his (R. 93:59, 63). 
Sergeant Anderson testified on rebuttal that it was highly improbable that a 
backpack placed on the back seat or floor of a car would land directly on the passenger 
seat in a convenient upright position after a collision of this type (R. 93 68). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGl 'MEN I • 
Dererkia:u ^d i , ^ u^ v. >» R;K^ ;.-> .ii^uiiicicnt to support his conviction for illegal 
p u ^ e ^ l i U I mill I l i l i i i l l l l l i n n * t1! I mil n H U M i l n i m In in In i l l || \ i l l I it l i \ c r a e d N f i L i t ' 
it is against the clear weight of the evidence. Here, the bad r i- -^-- * *^ ~ - flu1 \}\in >• r-
found on the front seat of the vehicle ov ei which defendant h.;d ^een m -o!e control for 
appi oximatel} eight hoiii: s } * loreover, the gun was in the a^me backpack as defendant's 
cigarette rolling • •. • 
from defendant's suspicious statements and conduct was sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction. Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
Defend iiiiil i I 11 m1  - lln III! ill ml iiiiiniitlctll plain i not ml sentencing because it 
failed to affirmatively extend the opportunity to defense counsel , -r -u e 
heai d How ever, defense counsel made a statement on behalf of himse it and the 
prosecutor at tin; beginning ol the sentencing hearing .u. -^ * unsolicited statement 
remo\ 
because defendant received the exact same sentence requested by counsel in that 
statement, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced b\ arv. orror, e\ en :f-ne r ; '••. 
I 1i I i i i I I I " f I I I I I " i l l ' I H " ! 1l l i l i l l III i 1 II II II II II II. III I s . 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT 
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHERE THE GUN 
WAS FOUND IN A BACKPACK ON THE FRONT PASSENGER 
SEAT OF A CAR OVER WHICH HE HAD HAD SOLE 
POSSESSION FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HOURS, AND 
WHERE HIS CIGARETTE ROLLING PAPERS WERE FOUND IN 
THE SAME BACKPACK2 
Defendant claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his 
conviction for illegal possession of a firearm because it "shows that [he] did not 
cexercise[] dominion or control' over the firearm 'with knowledge of its presence.'" 
Aplt. Br. at 17 (citations omitted). Specifically, defendant argues that "[t]here was no 
evidence presented that [he] knew the firearm was in the car, let alone in the back pack 
owned by Ms. Stewart. Moreover, the State presented no evidence that Mr. Powell 
exercised any control over the firearm." Id. Defendant's claim is without merit. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, [this Court] must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, f 5, 975 P.2d 501 (citation 
omitted). 
:On appeal, defendant challenges only his illegal possession of a firearm 
conviction. See Aplt. Br. at 13-18. He does not challenge his convictions for possession 
of drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance. 
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Section "V)-10-503 provides that a person "may not possess an> handgun ' it" 
! le "is an unlaw fill user of a controlled substance. . I..M i^de -\nn. S 76-10-50^(3) 
unlawful user of a controlled substance, id. lie claims only that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove he possessed the gun found next to him in his car on December 1.7, 
l l W * > . p l l H i ml I • ••' ' . . . • . . ' • - • 
"[Ajctual physical possession is i lot i lecessan • t : :: m\ ri ;::t a defendant of possession 
t^lltn illegal weapon]." MLIU -. r'ox, ~09 P.2d 31 o, 3 Is (Ltah 1985). Rather, a 
Mutuant may be convicteu pa^cd on constructs e possession so long as "there %,. a 
e i . . . ^ 
accused had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control o\ •* •*• ; 
Id. at 319; State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991). "[I]f the evidence 
i-'liovujj ihai [delendant| 'exercised dominion and control' ovei the weapon, 'with 
knowledge of its present1,' ' ^w i^idenc"1 • > -nOu MI1 ' • "i" < ' •" " " (h« IUJ'I h 
may have shared control of the weapon vx vn ins wite and ihe third party." State v. Bunks, 
" J< i I1 M i 3X0, I - -~ tat, i *86) (quoting State v. Bankhead, ^0 I Ttah 3d 135.' ™. " , 4 
P \\ <\)i)l K03 I i"17D> 
''Whether a sufficient ne\— . . . exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case/' r ^ , - > 2d at 319; £7/<7v, f^ O P ?d -.t 1 "88. Relevant factors include 
. - . is] foui id '; 
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"incriminating statements made by the accused"; "incriminating behavior of the accused"; 
and the "presence of [the gun] in a specific area over which the accused had control, such 
as a closet or drawer containing the accused's clothes or other personal effects." Fox. 
709 P.2d at 319 (citation omitted). This list of factors is not exhaustive. See State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911. Nonetheless, consideration of those factors 
here makes clear that defendant's conviction is not "against the clear weight of the 
evidence." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, at f 5 (citation omitted). 
Ownership or occupancy. The gun was found in a backpack sitting on the front 
passenger seat of the car defendant was driving (R. 93:10, 12-13. 56). The car was 
registered to defendant (R. 93:39, 48). When the gun was found, defendant had been in 
sole possession of the car for approximately eight hours (R. 93:60-62). Cf State v. 
Rivera. 906 P.2d 318, 319-20 (Utah App. 1995) (holding that where defendant had 
exclusive control over truck in which gun found on passenger side floor board, fact that 
gun may have been girlfriend's "would not negate a finding of defendant's constructive 
possession when it was shown that he had dominion and control over the gun"), rev 'd in 
part on other grounds, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997). 
Incriminating statements. The gun was discovered during a search of 
defendant's car (R. 93:10, 12-13, 56). Prior to the search, defendant said something "to 
the effect of don't search my vehicle" (R. 93:7. 20). Then, when confronted with the gun 
at the scene, defendant reacted without surprise that it was found (R. 93:68). He rnereK 
10 
stated that his wife had put the gun in the car and then focused on whether the gun was 
i n d u e d u i ' 
'""Hi mi i<il ddendant admitted Ii "« i k u I U I K uurivrd hen gun in her hack pack i lv. 
93:65-66). He claimed, however, that he did not know she had left her backpack ii i tl le 
back seat of the ^ar when she left earlier that morning (R. 93:57, 66). I lis explanation 
: .;c DdcrvpaCK must have jumped fron i the back seat to tl le front seat during the car 
an. idmt w is ulivi rvi l i lnl it In ill 111 MI " I l!| » St*r^tMii11 '» inllln r .un MMihetl ill n is 
"highly improbable" that a backpack placed on the back seat or floor of a car would land 
directly on the front passenger seat in a convenient upright position after a collision of 
)• 
Incriminating conduct, ruici curium. tl 
accident were seriously in; . M the officers* primary concern upon arriving at the jw^e 
was to rem.ove iKicndoiu .^  u^aouu ^ v . c n-m lanes of traffic (R. 93:4-5, 25). To tl lat 
1
 I If MP|VI " !" ipu/p r n l M push llu1 ., u h Stjiret in"1 ' nl i i q i i i i u i l n J ^ i ' ' . 
93:5). However, as Anderson went to get into the car, defendant ."walked expeditiously 
towards [Trn1 " ~/\ 'ng Anderson the impression that defendant "did \ sun' --ic *-i 'I ,> 
»,:i'. jxpianvi on: 
I seen Officer Anderson approaching -i> ..ir .K^ U looked like ihe> 
wanted to move it. So I asked hin. \ ie\. do \ ou want me to move 
my car, you w ant me to t^eer it olf. i le gues. I d« <n t mn ; 
and I Go, no Fd rather do it it'Ninv ..tr ; •:: i li< \\n\k -
know, Fm sure you've got enough othei tun u* io So i 
volunteered to move my own car. 
(R. 93:54). 
Presence of gun in area over which defendant had control and in which were 
located other personal effects. The gun was found in a backpack located on the front 
passenger seat of a car over which defendant had had exclusive control for approximately 
eight hours (R. 93:10, 60-62). Moreover, the gun was found in the same backpack in 
which defendant's cigarette rolling papers were found (R. 93:10, 12-13. 56). 
Other considerations: witness credibility. Finally, defendant testified at trial. 
Thus, the trial court had the opportunity to observe defendant's demeanor and evaluate 
his credibility as he proclaimed his innocence. Here, the trial court obviously did not 
find defendant credible. "[Tjrial courts are accorded great discretion in determining 
factual matters" because "*[t]hey are in the best position to assess the credibility of 
witnesses/' State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262. «[ 10, 988 P.2d 7. 
From this evidence, the trial court could infer that defendant knew the gun was in 
the car and that he exercised control over it just as he did his cigarette rolling papers. Cf 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20 (holding evidence sufficient to establish constructive possession 
where "occupancy and control was evidenced by the presence of his personal effects in 
the same room as [the contraband]"); Rivera. 906 P.2d at 320 (holding fact that gun may 
have been girlfriend's 'Svould not negate a finding of defendant's constructive 
possession when it was shown that he had dominion and control over the gun"): State v. 
SeeL 827 P.2d 954, 962 (Utah App. 1992) (holding evidence sufficient to establish 
12 
constructive possession where defendant knew gun was in suitcase on back seal a:u had 
access to it if he wanted to use ^ .\c evidence establishes a sufficient nexus 
IMMMIVMI defeiiiLiiiiiii iiiiiiiii iiin i iiiiiii in iii|i|i<nl HIS UHH n inni i in i . i ai u ; ' tiitfiks\ 
720 P.2d at 1384; Salas, 820 P.2d at l^oo. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
II. DEFENDANT'S S E N T E N C E S SHOULD BE AFFIRMED WHERE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL SPOKE AT SENTENCING AND 
DEFENDANT R E C E I V E D T H E VERY SENTENCES C L 
REQUESTED 
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error at sentencing because, 
i..'. i'.. .either detense counsel nor the 
prosecutor coneer :*v * i° -' | 
information material to the iniposition of sentence."" Aplt. Br. at 20 (quoting Utah R. 
< rim F JIBUTI, Defendant's claim, fails because in fact the trial court did hear from 
<*"*•" - " - :. wt -entences 
requested by his couiiow. 
To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that • 1 > an error occurred; (2) tl le 
^ . . si ' "OUT 1.. ' - Jcivrpiain *>* .. . nave obtained a 
more favorable result absent the error $'/< iu ? 1* 9 ut 1 850 P 2d 1201 1 208-09 (I to;: il 1 
1993). ' . 
i 3 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) provides: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant 
an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given 
an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition 
of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). This rule "imposes an affirmative obligation on the trial court to 
extend the opportunity to be heard; it does not contemplate the court will passively wait 
for counsel to make a request to be heard." State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241. If 32, 3 I 
P.3d 615, cert granted, 43 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). 
Defendant claims the trial court here violated rule 22(a) because it "heard from 
neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor" before imposing sentence. Aplt. Br. at 20. 
However, in fact defense counsel spoke at defendant's sentencing. Moreover, defendant 
received the exact sentences his counsel requested. Thus, the case on which defendant 
relies, Wanosik is distinguishable. Aplt. Br. at 21. 
In Wanosik, defendant "was represented at the hearing by counsel but did not 
appear personally at the hearing." 2001 UT App 241, at f 5. Defense counsel "expressed 
to the court her belief that Wanosik had intended to appear for sentencing" and asked the 
court "to give counsel time to locate [him]." Id. The trial court rejected defense 
counsel's request and, without further input from either defense counsel or the prosecutor, 
sentenced defendant to the maximum terms—one year and six months respectively—on 
each of his convictions, despite AP&P's recommendation of lighter sentences. Id. at 
14 
1
 :'c 3. 5. I his Court held that the trial court's action, violated rule 22(a) because the court 
mnounced •»ai!e»iu: vulltuiii hearing from either defense counsel or the prosecutor. 
hi it 1| i } 1 hi ^ * 'unit thru ill Hiiiii'il (fill! tin i i n ii ' ' 1* in ! li.trnnlf «,s In r.iuse | III |,ml r i i k ' i 
defense counsel or the prosecutor been given a chance to address AP&P's 
recommendation , the sentencing outconv a\ well have been more favorable 
I hiii i III in i minimum sail let itvs. imposed In ill! 
Here, in contrast, the trial court did hear ir* ^ ^
 1 
him, the prosecutor prior to sentencing, SpecificaiK. defense counsel indicated that both 
he and the prosecutor iidu ~_eed to recommend ihut defendant's sentences ran 
( III i l l II l III I i t 1 h a I l II in i il mi i l l 
court never formally extended to counsel an opportunity to be heard. However, this was 
only because counsel spoke before being invited. r rule ?2i'a) nor Wanosik requires 
.as aireao_. *ee:. :.. "^nsequer^1' 
defendant cannot show that cithei c -
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sentence (R. 94:Tab 7:1-3). In addition, those sentences were apparently consistent w ith 
those recommended in his presentence investigation report (R. 94:Tab 7:1-3). Cf. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 33 (concluding failure to hear from counsel was not 
harmless where sentences given were more severe than those recommended in 
presentence investigation report). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED }±_ May 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNnC 
Assistant Attorney General 
3Defendant also claims he should be resentenced because "'[t]he due process 
clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act 
on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a 
sentence.'" Apit. Br. at 19 (quoting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)). 
However, defendant neither includes a copy of his presentence investigation report in the 
record on appeal, nor identifies any information on which the trial court improperly 
relied. "Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998). "In 
the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court can only assume the regularity of 
the proceedings below." Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67; see also State v. Blubanglu 904 P.2d 
688, 699 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998) 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous 
weapon/handgun — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
RULE 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
fa) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendants 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
if) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202( 1Kb), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
